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The tendency to look for evidence that supports, rather than questions, one’s viewpoint
(preference effect) is a pervasive phenomenon. Although one important goal of edu-
cation is developing critical thinking, the widespread practice of grading might discour-
age students in appreciating disconﬁrming evidence. We hypothesized that individual
grading increases the preference effect. In Experiment 1, participants who expected to
be graded exhibited a higher preference effect compared to participants who expected
their work to be merely visible. Experiment 2 replicated this effect and further showed
that grading increased participants’ perception of a competitive social comparison.
Implications for educational policies are discussed.
In many educational systems, students learn that in
order to write a convincing essay, they must include a
thesis, an antithesis, and a synthesis in the development
of their argument. The rationale for this recommen-
dation is that once students have stated their main point
of view, they should be able to refute it, or to propose an
alternative point of view, and then to come up with a
perspective that includes, compares, and articulates the
opposing points of view. This procedure, however,
requires from students to be able to decenter from a sin-
gle idea or hypothesis, that is, to question their own
point of view, an ability that is easily impaired when stu-
dents are under some evaluative pressure (Butera &
Buchs, 2005). In an environment where evaluative press-
ure is pervasive, as it is the case with grading at school
and university, it is then possible that students want to
conﬁrm their point of view rather than being open to
information that might question their position. In the
present research, we aim at addressing this problem
and testing the effects of grades on people’s tendency
to look for evidence that conﬁrms initial preferences.
We hypothesized that the expectation of being graded
will increase this tendency compared to situations in
which people’s work is simply made visible.
GRADES AND PROPERTIES OF GRADES
Grades can be used to produce two types of assessment
(Brookhart, 2004). On one hand, they allow comparing
the current level of performance (or knowledge) of a
person to given criteria (i.e., criterion-referenced assess-
ments). On the other hand, they can be used to compare
levels of performance (or knowledge) across individuals,
thereby allowing the establishment of an implicit or
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explicit ranking (i.e., norm-referenced assessment;
Glaser, 1963). In both cases, the main advantage of
grades is the visibility they provide: They summarize
performance in a number—or a letter, or a judgment—
and thereby constitute an easily interpretable criterion
of success (or failure). This is probably the reason why
grades constitute the main method of assessment in
educational and professional settings (Knight & Yorke,
2003).
The visibility afforded by grades, however, may also
originate an undesired by-product: By making very clear
the differences in merit across people, grades operate a
switch in individuals’ interest from a focus on the task
to a focus on the social comparison of competences
(Pulfrey, Buchs, & Butera, 2011), with detrimental con-
sequences for learning and performance. Indeed, the
literature on attentional focusing, conﬂict regulation,
and achievement goals shows that grades could induce
self-evaluation threat (Muller & Butera, 2007) and cre-
ate an evaluative pressure that focuses individuals on
performance relative to others (Butler, 1987), which in
turn moves individual’s attention away from the con-
cerns of mastering the task as it fosters assertion of one’s
competence over that of others (Darnon & Butera, 2007;
Darnon, Muller, Schrager, Pannuzzo, & Butera, 2006).
In this respect, an impressive amount of research, dating
back more than 20 years, has shown that normative
assessment entails a long list of nefarious effects for
learning and performance. Grades hinder improvement
from one test to the following (R. G. Williams, Pollack,
& Ferguson, 1975), they reduce interest in the task at
hand (Harackiewicz, Abrahams, & Wageman, 1987),
they impair intrinsic motivation and performance
(Butler, 1987, 1988; Butler & Nisan, 1986; Pulfrey,
Darnon, & Butera, 2013). These results have been
replicated and extended by many other research teams,
in both psychology (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Harter, 1978)
and educational sciences (Black & Wiliam, 1998;
Thomas & Oldfather, 1997).
GRADES AND PREFERENCE EFFECT
One might wonder why is it important to understand the
effects of grades on the tendency to look for conﬁr-
mation of one’s own point of view. At least two reasons
can be mentioned. First, conﬁrmation bias—the
tendency to look for evidence that supports, rather than
questions, one’s hypothesis or viewpoint—is a pervasive
phenomenon, long known to hamper people’s ability to
develop critical thinking and logical argumentation
(Klayman & Ha, 1987). In particular, it has been argued
that conﬁrmation is mainly used when people need to
defend their point of view from an opponent or from
the risk of being wrong, which impairs the ability to
consider alternatives (Butera & Mugny, 2001; Mercier
& Sperber, 2011). At the same time, some results suggest
that standard methods of teaching (e.g., encouraging
students to present reasons for opinions they hold rather
than reasons against them) and standard methods of
evaluation (e.g., using grades) may foster this bias
(Nickerson, 1998). For example, when being graded
for written essays, students use more claims that contain
supporting evidence than claims that contain discon-
ﬁrming evidence (Narveson, 1980).
Second, conﬁrmation bias is frequent in groups,
which are often used in educational settings. When
occurring in groups, this bias (also called preference
effect) refers to insufﬁcient revisions of individual prefer-
ence during group discussions (Brodbeck, Kerschreiter,
Mojzisch, Frey, & Schulz-Hardt, 2002). More speciﬁ-
cally, the preference effect occurs because group mem-
bers have the tendency to evaluate information that is
consistent with their initial preferences more favorably
than information that is inconsistent (Greitemeyer &
Schultz-Hardt, 2003). In the domain of group decision
making, research has shown that the preference effect
increases in situations where individuals try to prove
themselves in front of others, for example, in competition
(Toma & Butera, 2009; Toma, Gilles, & Butera, 2013). In
their recent research, Toma, Gilles, et al. (2013) manipu-
lated members’ goals using either an individual (negative
goal interdependence—i.e., competition) or a group pro-
motion (positive goal interdependence—i.e., cooperation)
that was offered to group members who succeeded in solv-
ing the mystery of a car accident case. Participants were
also told that other (ﬁctitious) members had either dissent-
ing or identical initial preferences to their own. Results
indicated that the preference effect was higher in compe-
tition than in cooperation, and especially when parti-
cipants were facing the dissenting preferences of the
other group members. This effect was mediated by
self-enhancement strategies, which are known to reﬂect
strivings to raise one’s positive self-view and superiority
(Alicke & Sedikides, 2009).
The aim of the present research is to determine
whether a similar effect could be obtained with grades.
At school, students are often defending different points
of view and competing with one another for better
grades, even when working on group projects. Such
practices, however, can have opposite effects. On one
hand, this could be motivating because it increases stu-
dents’ visibility (Cameron & Pierce, 2002) and signals
a situation in which grades are used to produce
criterion-referenced evaluation (i.e., evaluation of a stu-
dent in comparison with a certain level of knowledge or
standard). On the other hand, this could be threatening
because it increases comparability of one’s work with
that of others (Marshall & Weinstein, 1984) and signals
a situation in which grades are used to produce
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norm-referenced evaluations (i.e., evaluation of a stu-
dent in comparison with other students). Studies have
shown that contexts in which one needs to prove oneself
in front of others lead to self-evaluative threats
(Dickerson, Gruenewald, & Kemeny, 2004), which in
turn increases the preference effect (Toma, Bry, &
Butera, 2013; Toma, Gilles, et al., 2013). This should
not be the case when visibility is merely emphasized by
the presence of a third person (Dickerson, Mycek, &
Zaldivar, 2008) or when the self-evaluation threat linked
to the normative facet of grades disappears, for
example, because one is assured of one’s own superiority
(Muller & Butera, 2007).
In sum, the visibility afforded by grades may not be a
problem in itself. It is rather the potentially competitive
social comparison elicited by grades that may focus
individuals on the defence of their own point of view.
Therefore in the present research we test the hypothesis
that in a group situation in which members face the dis-
sent of others, expecting one’s work to be graded should
increase the preference effect compared to expecting
one’s work to be merely visible.
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDIES
Two studies were conducted to test this hypothesis. The
task used was the same as the one used by Toma, Gilles,
et al. (2013). In this task participants were asked to indi-
vidually solve a car accident case and to ﬁnd the person
responsible for it (initial preference). Then they were
informed that other team members supported different
initial preferences because of the different information
they possessed. Participants were asked to read and to
rate the importance of the other members’ information,
which was either consistent or inconsistent with their
own initial preference. The preference effect was
calculated as the difference between the evaluation of
consistent and inconsistent information.
In Experiment 1, we tested our main hypothesis that
individual grading during group work should increase
the preference effect as compared with mere visibility
of one’s work. To test this hypothesis, we needed to
compare the focal condition of evaluation by grades
with two control conditions. First, we introduced a con-
trol condition in which individual work was simply vis-
ible but not graded. Second, we also introduced a
control condition without grades or visibility. Indeed,
as previously noted, grades imply both a focus on com-
petitive social comparison and increased visibility. If, as
hypothesized, grades increase the preference effect
because of the social comparison component, the
condition with individual grades should differ from the
condition with mere visibility. It is, however, possible
that, contrary to our expectation, it is indeed visibility
that increases the preference effect; in this case both
the graded and the mere visibility conditions should
induce a higher preference effect than the control con-
dition without grades or visibility. In Experiment 2, we
aimed at replicating Experiment 1 in a more naturalistic
context (i.e., classroom) and disentangling possible
confounds in the manipulation of visibility.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
A total of 61 university students from a Swiss
university took part in this experiment. Six participants
were excluded from the analyses because they did not
comply with the experimental script (i.e., they did not
choose Mr. X as the initial preference, to whom the
script and clues oriented them). The remaining sample
included 55 university students (34 women and 20
men, one student did not mention her or his gender
and age; M¼ 18.09 years, SD¼ 1.20). Participants were
randomly assigned to one of three experimental con-
ditions: graded–visible (n¼ 13), nongraded–visible
(n¼ 23) and nongraded–nonvisible (n¼ 19). Preliminary
analyses revealed that gender did not inﬂuence our
effects, and therefore this variable was not included in
ﬁnal analyses.
Procedure
Participants were told that they would participate in
a study on the resolution of criminal investigations
(for the exact materials, see Toma, Gilles, et al., 2013).
They worked individually, and then they were led to
imagine that they would work in a team with two other
students. The role-play story had participants pretend
they worked as police inspectors with two other people
in order to identify the party responsible for a car acci-
dent. Four people were potential suspects, but three of
them could be exonerated (Mr. X, Mrs. Y, Mr. Z) and
the fourth (Mr. X’s son) incriminated based on a critical
set of nine clues. All participants were oriented toward
Mr. X, whereas the two other ﬁctitious members were
attributed Mrs. Y and Mr. Z as initial preferences. All
participants were asked to commit to their initial prefer-
ence (Mr. X), and then they were informed that they did
not possess the entire set of information and that for this
reason they would be provided with supplementary
information given by the two other participants.
The manipulation of grades was introduced at this
point. In the graded–visible condition, participants were
told that the chief would be present and give an individ-
ual grade (ranging from 1 to 6, which corresponds to the
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usual grading range in Switzerland) to each inspector at
the end of the investigation. In the nongraded–visible
condition, participants were told that the chief would
be present because he is interested to follow the investi-
gation. In the nongraded–nonvisible condition, parti-
cipants were told that the chief of the police inspectors
would not be able to follow the investigation. It should
be noted that the script did not specify that grades
would be used as norm-based assessment, but we
assumed that the participants would behave as a func-
tion of this meaning of grades to the extent that
norm-based assessment is by far the most used (Knight
& Yorke, 2003).
Subsequently, participants received six items of infor-
mation, three consistent and three inconsistent with
their initial preference (Mr. X), supposedly coming from
the two other people. An example of consistent infor-
mation was that the person responsible for the accident
is a man. An example of inconsistent information was
that the person responsible for the accident is younger
than 30 years old (participants knew that Mr. X is 53
years old). The consistent and inconsistent information
was presented in random order for each participant.
Participants were asked to evaluate the items of infor-
mation with regard to their importance in making an
optimal decision. Finally, participants were asked to
make a ﬁnal decision based on all the pieces of infor-
mation. At the end, participants were debriefed and
thanked for their participation.
Measures
Manipulation check. To check whether participants
correctly perceived the graded–visible condition com-
pared to the other conditions, they were asked to answer
the following question: During the investigation, did the
chief tell you that you would be individually evaluated?
(Yes=No).
Preference for consistent information. Participants
evaluated to what extent the six items of information
they received were important in reaching the optimal
decision, on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all important)
to 9 (very important). This information included three
items consistent and three items inconsistent with the
participant’s initial preference. One consistent item and
one inconsistent item were dropped from the analyses,
as they lowered the reliability test.1 The preference for
consistent information was computed by subtracting
the ratings of the two inconsistent information items
(r¼ .47) from the ratings of the two consistent infor-
mation items (r¼ .55) and refers to the extent to which
participants evaluated information in a way that con-
ﬁrmed their initial preference. A positive score indicates
that consistent information was considered more valu-
able than inconsistent information, and a negative score
indicates that inconsistent information was considered
more valuable than consistent information.
Results
Manipulation Check
All participants in the graded–visible condition
responded ‘‘Yes’’ and all participants in the other two
conditions responded ‘‘No’’ to the question regarding
the individual evaluation.
Preference for Consistent Information
The results suggested that the preference for consist-
ent information was higher in the graded–visible con-
dition (M¼ 1.46, SD¼ 2.00) compared to the
nongraded–visible condition (M¼0.24, SD¼ 2.09,
d¼ 0.65), as predicted, but also slightly higher compared
to the nongraded–nonvisible condition (M¼ 0.86,
SD¼ 2.13, d¼ 0.29). Of interest, the preference for
consistent-information was higher in the nongraded–
nonvisible condition compared to the nongraded–visible
condition (d¼ 0.47). The results are presented in
Figure 1. It should be noted that in the whole article
we do not report the signiﬁcance tests, in accordance
with Basic and Applied Social Psychology policies
(Traﬁmow, 2014; see also Traﬁmow, 2003).
Although our main interest was to study preference
for consistent information, it is common practice in this
literature to also report conﬁrmatory decisions. There-
fore, a dichotomous measure was derived from the ﬁnal
1The reliability of the three inconsistent items was a¼ .34; after
dropping the concerned item, the reliability raised to a¼ .63. The
reliability of the three consistent items was a¼ .27; after dropping
the concerned item, the reliability raised to a¼ .71.
FIGURE 1 Experiment 1: Mean preference for consistent infor-
mation as a function of the experimental conditions.
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decision reported by participants. When the answer con-
ﬁrmed their initial preference (Mr. X), it was coded 1,
whereas when the answer did not (Mrs. Y, Mr. Z, or
Mr. X’s son) it was coded 0. Across all conditions,
49.1% of participants conﬁrmed their initial preference
(Mr. X). In particular, the proportion of conﬁrmatory
decisions was 10.9% in the graded–visible condition,
25.5% in the nongraded–visible condition, and 12.7%
in the nongraded–nonvisible condition.
Discussion
The results of this experiment provide preliminary evi-
dence for our focal hypothesis. Indeed, participants
who expected their work to be individually graded
exhibited a higher preference for consistent information
compared to participants who expected their work to be
only visible. The alternative hypothesis that the prefer-
ence effect should increase as a function of visibility
was not supported.
An interesting, although unexpected, result was that
the preference effect was higher in the nongraded–non-
visible condition compared to the nongraded–visible
condition. This may suggest that when one’s work is
not expected to be visible, individuals are not parti-
cularly motivated to revise their preferences. This is con-
sistent with research on social loaﬁng showing that
people reduce their individual contribution to group
work when their effort is not visible (e.g., Karau &
Williams, 1993; Latane´, Williams, & Harkins, 1979;
Williams, Harkins, & Latane´, 1981).
EXPERIMENT 2
The ﬁrst aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the effect
found in Experiment 1 and to conﬁrm that individual
grading indeed increases the preference effect. The
second aim was to test an assumption underlying our
general hypothesis. We argued in the theoretical intro-
duction that one important component of grading is
the focus on competitive comparison with other group
members; we therefore added a measure of perceived
competition to test whether participants perceived more
competition in the graded–visible condition compared
to other control conditions (see next).
The third aim was to disentangle possible confounds
related to the manipulation of visibility. In the non-
graded–visible condition of Experiment 1 participants
were told that their chief would be present because he
was interested to follow the investigation. It is therefore
difﬁcult to know whether the reduced extent of the
preference for consistent information was due to the
expectation of one’s work being visible or to the mere
presence of the chief. Thus, in this second experiment
we broke down the former nongraded–visible condition
into a condition of visibility and a condition of mere
presence. Visibility, or social visibility, is at stake when-
ever an individual is observed while achieving a task
(Bond & Titus, 1983; Zajonc, 1965), whereas mere pres-
ence of a person occurs when this person is physically
present during the individual’s performance and the
individual knows that this person is not interested in
watching performance (Cottrell, Wack, Sekerak, &
Rittle, 1968). In both cases, some extent of visibility of
the individual who is performing is at stake, but they
are conceptually different. Of interest, such situations
that increase individual visibility are only deleterious
to the extent that the observer’s presence explicitly
implies the possibility of a negative evaluation (e.g.,
when a panel of evaluators is there to observe in a criti-
cal and rejecting manner the individual perform;
Gruenewald, Kemeny, Aziz, & Fahey, 2004). Otherwise,
visibility situations from which explicit negative social
evaluation is absent do not elicit stress (Dickerson et al.,
2008). Thus, although in both cases of visibility and mere
presence individual visibility is at stake, we should not
expect any deleterious effect, that is any increase of the
preference effect: Both the visibility and the mere pres-
ence conditions should then lead to a lower preference
effect compared to the graded–visible condition.
Another confound in the nongraded–visible con-
dition was due to the presence of accountability
demands. Accountability, deﬁned as the ‘‘pressure to
justify one’s causal interpretation to others’’ (Tetlock,
1985, p. 227), is often manipulated by increasing the visi-
bility of one’s judgement or position taken. For
example, participants may be told that they will have
to justify their judgement or position to someone else
(Tetlock, 1985), which implies both visibility and evalu-
ation. However, contrary to a situation of grading, this
evaluation is not normative: The focus of accountability
is not on the comparability of one’s work to that of
others but on the underlying reasons that justify one’s
own position, on examining and evaluating all available
information that would help ﬁnding the most appropri-
ate solution (Johnson & Johnson, 1985). Indeed, the
literature investigating accountability has shown that
asking people to be accountable for their judgments
and decisions has positive effects on several tasks,
speciﬁcally by reducing reasoning biases (Lerner, Gold-
berg, & Tetlock, 1998; Tetlock, 1983, 1985) and results,
for instance, in individuals producing more integrative
complex thoughts (Green, Visser, & Tetlock, 2000; Tet-
lock, 1983), or in becoming more responsive to
additional diagnostic evidence (Tetlock & Boettger,
1989). Thus, compared to a grading situation, we
expected accountability to reduce the preference effect.
In sum, we hypothesized that the preference effect
will be higher in the graded–visible condition compared
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to the other three experimental conditions (visibility,
mere presence, accountability).
Method
Participants
A total of 61 university students from a Swiss univer-
sity took part to this experiment (42 women and 19 men;
M¼ 21.31 years, SD¼ 1.84). Participants were randomly
assigned to one of the four experimental conditions:
graded-visible (n¼ 18), visibility (n¼ 16), mere presence
(n¼ 13), accountability (n¼ 14). Again gender had no
effects and was not included in the ﬁnal analyses.
Procedure
The same procedure as in Experiment 1 was used.
However, this time the experiment was not conducted
in the lab but was part of a class exercise. The instruc-
tions used in the experimental conditions were the fol-
lowing: in the graded–visible condition, participants
were told that the chief would be present and give each
inspector an individual grade (ranging from 1 to 6) at
the end of the investigation. In the visibility condition,
participants were told that the chief would be present
because he is interested to follow the investigation. In
the mere presence condition, participants were only told
that the chief of the police inspectors would be present.
In the accountability condition, participants were told
that the chief would be present because the inspectors
will have to justify their ﬁnal decision to him.
Again, participants evaluated the importance of
consistent and inconsistent information for the ﬁnal
decision. Finally, they assessed their perception of
competition and were debriefed and thanked for their
participation.
Measures
Preference for consistent information. This measure
was computed as in Experiment 1.2 The correlation
between the two items of consistent information was
r¼ .39, and the correlation between the two items of
inconsistent information was r¼ .58.
Perceived competition. To test whether indeed the
graded–visible condition induced perceived competition
to a higher extent than the other experimental con-
ditions, participants answered a two-item questionnaire
on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (totally). The
questions asked whether participants perceived a com-
petitive atmosphere and whether they perceived the
other members as rivals. The two questions were com-
bined into a single score of perceived competition
(r¼ .56; M¼ 3.89, SD¼ 1.94).
Results
Preference for Consistent Information
The results suggested that the preference for consist-
ent information was higher in the graded–visible con-
dition (M¼ 0.89, SD¼ 1.72) compared to the visibility
condition (M¼ 0.01, SD¼ 2.22, d¼ 0.44), the mere pres-
ence condition (M¼ 0.23, SD¼ 1.82, d¼ 0.63), and
the accountability condition (M¼ 0.71, SD¼ 2.14,
d¼ 0.82). The results are presented in Figure 2.
Again, we reported conﬁrmatory decisions. Across all
conditions, 31.1% conﬁrmed their initial preference (Mr.
X); in particular, the proportion of conﬁrmatory deci-
sions was 9.8% in the graded–visible condition, 9.8%
in the visibility condition, 3.3% in the mere presence
condition, and 8.2% in the accountability condition.
Perceived Competition
The results on the perception of competition mir-
rored the results on the preference for consistent infor-
mation: Perception of competition was higher in the
graded–visible condition (M¼ 4.75, SD¼ 1.96) com-
pared to the visibility condition (M¼ 3.81, SD¼ 2.02,
d¼ 0.47), the mere presence condition (M¼ 3.19,
SD¼ 1.8, d¼ 0.98), and the accountability condition
(M¼ 3.54, SD¼ 1.75, d¼ 0.65).
Discussion
The ﬁrst aim of this second experiment was fulﬁlled, as
the results replicated the effect found in Experiment 1.
2The reliability of the three inconsistent items was a¼ .46; after
dropping the concerned item, the reliability raised to a¼ .73. The
reliability of the three consistent items was a¼ .19; after dropping
the concerned item, the reliability raised to a¼ .56.
FIGURE 2 Experiment 2: Mean preference for consistent infor-
mation as a function of the experimental conditions.
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Indeed, the graded–visible condition increased the
preference for consistent information, compared to the
other conditions (visibility, mere presence, account-
ability). Of interest, the effects on perceived competition
mirrored the effects on the preference for consistent
information, suggesting that participants were more
inclined to perceive competition with others when eval-
uated with grades than in the other experimental con-
ditions. This supports our assumption that evaluation
by grades contains a normative component to a larger
extent than the other conditions.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In many educational systems, the goal of developing
critical thinking and logical argumentation among stu-
dents is often hampered by the use of standard methods
of teaching and evaluation, in particular normative
assessment under the form of grades. The practice of
using grades was shown to hinder students’ ability to
develop counter-argumentation and to avoid conﬁrma-
tory tendencies (Nickerson, 1998). Two experiments
tested the hypothesis that the expectation of being
graded in a group-work situation increases the prefer-
ence for information that is consistent with one’s initial
solution.
Experiment 1 showed that participants who expected
their work to be individually graded exhibited a higher
preference effect compared to participants who expected
their work to be merely visible in the group. Experiment
2 replicated this effect and showed that when parti-
cipants expect their work to be visible, the presence of
grades was associated with an increase in the preference
effect as compared with the mere visibility of one’s
work, the mere presence of an evaluative agent, or the
expectancy of being accountable for one’s work. This
second experiment also showed that participants per-
ceived more competition with other group members
when they expected to be graded than when in the three
other conditions.
Taken together, the two experiments point to the fact
that the potential of grades to elicit a preference effect is
not due to their visibility component, as suggested by
the difference between the graded condition and other
visibility conditions in both experiments. A possible
interpretation is that this effect is due to the ability of
grades to induce a competitive social comparison, as sug-
gested by the result found in Experiment 2 where grades
increased the perception of a competitive atmosphere and
of others as competitors. To support such an interpret-
ation, future research should directly manipulate what
we assume to be at the core of the facilitating effects of
grades on the preference effect, namely, a threatening
social comparison. In this respect, it is important to note
that social comparison is a pervasive phenomenon,
occurring even unconsciously (Mussweiler, Ru¨ter, &
Epstude, 2004), and we think grades can produce the
aforementioned effects even when institutional grading
practices do not provide ofﬁcial opportunities for social
comparison (e.g., posting grades or handing out tests in
front of the class). Indeed, students can directly or
indirectly compare grades during course chitchatting,
breaks, and recess but can also be requested to construe
relative positions within the class during interaction with
parents or other signiﬁcant adults.
It could be objected that the task we used is quite an
unusual one for students, especially with a grade
attached to it, and therefore the present results would
have low ecological validity. It is indeed true that our
speciﬁc materials are different from the usual pedagogi-
cal materials that can be found at school or university.
However, it is important to note that the hidden proﬁle
task was created and conceptualized to precisely rep-
resent the common situation of work in heterogeneous
groups, like students who have different resources or
different domains of expertise and are asked to cooper-
ate on a group project (Greitmeyer & Schulz-Hardt,
2003; Stasser & Titus, 1985; Toma, Gilles, et al.,
2013). Moreover, the present laboratory studies are
arguably less involving than real-life situations in which
grades have concrete and long-term consequences on
pupils’ and students’ prospects in their curriculum and
eventually in their professional life. Hence, given the
majority of medium to large effect sizes observed on
rather small samples (most ds ranged from 0.44 to
0.82), we would expect that with usual scholastic materi-
als the results observed in this study should be replicated
and the effect sizes should be even larger.
Finally, the present research has disentangled the
effects of grades from the effects of visibility, and in this
respect it has showed that the effects of grades on the
preference effect are most probably due to their norma-
tive facet, that is, the fact that they facilitate competitive
social comparison with coworkers and not to their
visibility facet. This general result has the potential to
stimulate new research in two directions. First, the
present results point to the fact that the use of grades,
possibly due to the focus on competition with other
group members, interferes with the capacity of indivi-
duals to consider, in an unbiased way, information com-
ing from others. This is a highly valued capacity,
especially in decision-making contexts where important
decisions need to be made and where, precisely, valuing
different alternatives can help ﬁghting pressure to
conformity and avoiding situations of defective
group decision making in which alternative options are
often not considered or too rapidly rejected, that is,
the well-known groupthink phenomenon (Janis, 1982).
Hence, the present results show that grades can increase
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such biased individual appreciation of new information
presentation, which could intervene in more complex
group decision-making situations, including cooperative
ones. It also follows from this discussion that grades
may nullify the dynamics of information exchange, a
skill that is extremely important in educational practices
involving group learning (Johnson & Johnson, 1985).
Second, these results may also inform the scientiﬁc
community as regards its own functioning, and in parti-
cular its capacity to put scientiﬁc knowledge into ques-
tion. Indeed, notwithstanding Popper’s (1966) call for
considering that scientiﬁc theories should be falsiﬁable,
scientists have long been shown to indulge in conﬁr-
mation bias just as lay people (Mahoney, 1976; Mitroff,
1974). The present study paves the way for future applied
studies that could aim at investigating why scientists are
often reluctant to admit that they might be wrong. One
possibility, building on the reported results, is that the
pressure of academic evaluation—under various forms
of normative assessment such as impact factor of one’s
publications, H-factor of individual researchers, or rank-
ing of one’s university—might accentuate the phenom-
enon of preference for consistent information.
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